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DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET:
IMPACTS OF THE ABOLITION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
MARKET POWER IN PATENT TYING CASES
INTRODUCTION
The issue before the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Tool
Works Inc. v. Independent Ink was "whether, in a claim based on unlaw-
ful tying under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the existence of a patent on
the tying product raises a presumption that the patent holder has market
power,",2 thus rendering the tying agreement illegal per se. In a decision
that logically followed the United States Supreme Court's and Con-
gress's more recent expansion of patent holder rights, the Court held that
the existence of a patent does not presumptively confer market power on
patent holders. By abolishing the presumption, the Court rejected argu-
ments to maintain an irrebuttable presumption of market power or to
create a rebuttable presumption.
In future patent tying cases, the moving party must now prove that
the patent holder has market power under a rule of reason standard. By
adopting a rule of reason standard, the Court moves away from equating
the legal monopoly granted on patent-holders with the economic monop-
oly that is assailed by antitrust law. While providing only vague guide-
lines to assess this standard, the Court properly recognized that each pat-
ent is unique, and sufficient information exists to analyze the market
power of the patented tying product. By permitting defendants to contest
the issue of the market power of its patent, the Court has increased 1) the
burden to prove the market power of the patent, 2) the importance and
role of experts in patent tying cases, and 3) the burden on the court sys-
tem because parties will choose to fully litigate claims instead of settling.
Despite these burdens, the most beneficial impact of Independent Ink,
however, is that courts will decide an issue of law based not on a blanket
presumption, but on the merits of each case. After Independent Ink, for a
patent tying arrangement to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, evidence
must be presented to prove market power in the relevant market regard-
less of the existence of a patent.3
Part I of this Comment will examine the cases and legislative ac-
tions that influenced the Independent Ink Court. Part II will discuss how
the case came before the Court, as well as analyze the Court's unanimous
1. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (Alito, J. took no part in the consideration or decision of the case).
2. Kevin D. McDonald, Baseball as a Metaphor: On Illinois Tool and the Presumption of
Market Power in Patent Tying Cases, SL025 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 25, 27 (2005).
3. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
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decision. Part III addresses the policies advocated by the parties in Inde-
pendent Ink and the impact of the Court's ruling on patent tying ar-
rangement antitrust litigation. This final section will also explain why
any standard other than an irrebuttable presumption of market power
increases the burden of a plaintiff bringing a patent tying arrangement
antitrust claim.
I. BACKGROUND
A tying arrangement is a "form of marketing in which a seller in-
sists on selling two distinct products or services as a package."4 The
foundation of a tying claim lies in the Sherman Antitrust Act. Section 1
of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract ... in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal."5 A patent confers upon its holder a limited mo-
nopoly, preventing others from manufacturing, selling, and using a pat-
ented invention and its substantial equivalents. 6 In an antitrust context,
the "essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the
seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the
buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different
terms."7 The patent policy of encouraging innovation via a grant of a
limited legal monopoly is at odds with the antitrust policy of prevention
of restraints on competition and trade.8 Despite the inherent differences
of antitrust and patent law, the Court's decisions interpreting the scope of
the legal monopoly in patent tying cases have consistently been guided
by antitrust law. By adopting antitrust law into its patent tying jurispru-
dence, the Court effectively presumed that a legal monopoly was the
equivalent of an economic monopoly.
Presumptions are equitable constructs developed to take the place of
evidence that was otherwise, at no fault of the offering party, unavail-
able.9 The presumption of market power in patent tying arrangements
was created during an unsophisticated regulatory regime, in which anti-
trust law was in its infancy, seeking its boundaries. The presumption of
market power in tying arrangements where the tying product is patented
evolved over four distinct periods with its origins in the patent misuse
doctrine. "Patent misuse is generally defined as an impermissible at-
4. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
5. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § I (West 2006).
6. Craig McLaughlin, Monopoly Power of Patents and Antitrust Law Collide in Patent
Tying, 48 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 38, 44. (2006); see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West 2006).
7. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
8. Alison K. Hayden, Patent Tying Agreements: Presumptively Illegal?, 5 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 94, 100 n.37 (2005).
9. Id. at 115 n.142.
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tempt to extend the time or scope of the patent grant."1° Initially, the
patent misuse doctrine was created as a defense to patent infringement
claims. The Court took a doctrine that had been solely applied as a de-
fense to patent infringement, and applied it in an antitrust context in In-
ternational Salt Co. v. United States." At this period, the Court viewed
all tying arrangements as per se illegal, regardless of whether the tying
product was patented.
12
In the half century following International Salt, however, the atti-
tudes of the Court, Congress, and regulatory agencies slowly swung back
in favor of patent holders. While it once may have been impossible to
project a motion picture film or make a light bulb without access to pat-
ents that dominated those markets, such difficulties are less of an issue
today.' 3 The Court eventually adopted the position that tying arrange-
ments may offer pro-competitive effects. 14 At the end of the twentieth
century, the Court, Congress, and the government's antitrust regulatory
agencies each took actions that further undermined the strength of the
market power presumption, setting the stage for Independent Ink.
A. Patent Misuse Doctrine and the Creation of the Presumption
The patent misuse doctrine evolved as a defense to patent infringe-
ment claims. The Supreme Court first encountered tying arrangements
in the course of patent infringement in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.' 5 A. B.
Dick Co. brought a patent infringement action against a licensee.' 6 A. B.
Dick patented and licensed a mimeograph to customers on the condition
that all stencil paper, ink, and other supplies used with the mimeograph
(all unpatented items) be purchased from A. B. Dick Co.17 The Court
held that the defendants infringed on A. B. Dick Co.'s patent by using
ink from a different supplier. 8 Chief Justice White dissented from the
majority, classifying the tying arrangement as an "attempt to increase the
scope of the monopoly granted by a patent ... which tend[s] to increase
monopoly and to burden the public in the exercise of their common
rights."' 9
In response to the Court's opinion in A. B. Dick, Congress amended
antitrust laws to reflect Justice White's fears of the anticompetitive ef-
10. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 402 (2003).
11. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
12. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 41.
13. 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 1737c (2d ed. 2004).
14. See Fortner Enters. v. United States, 394 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1969) (Fortas, J. and White, J.,
dissenting).
15. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
16. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. at 11.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 12, 49.
19. Id. at 70 (White, J., dissenting).
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fects of patent-tying arrangements. 20 Through legislation, Congress clas-
sified the conditioning of a sale of a patented or unpatented product on
the purchaser's promise to not use the supplies or materials offered by
competitors of the merchant-seller as per se illegal. 21 The amendment
effectively overruled A. B. Dick.
22
Five years after A. B. Dick, the Court heard another patent-tying
case, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.
23
Motion Picture Patents owned a patent on a film projection machine, and
required, by a notice affixed to each projector, licensees of the projector
to only show films containing a patent owned by Motion Picture Pat-
ents.24 The patent on the films was separate and unrelated to the patent
on the projector. The Court found no support in the patent laws for the
proposition that a patentee may "prescribe by notice attached to a pat-
ented machine the conditions of its use and the supplies which must be
used in the operation of it, under pain of infringement of the patent.,
26
Patent law "allows a grant only of the right to an exclusive use of the
new and useful discovery which has been made-this and nothing
more."
27
The final case in this period, United States v. Loew's, Inc., 28 in-
volved a copyright tying agreement. In Loew's, the Court held illegal,
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the practice of conditioning the sale
or license of one or more copyrighted films on the purchase of one or
more inferior or unwanted films. 29  The Court stated that "[m]arket
dominance-some power to control price and to exclude competition-is
by no means the only test of whether the seller has the requisite eco-
nomic power. 30  Abstaining from performing even the most spurious
market analysis, the Court instead held that the "requisite economic
power may be found on the basis of either uniqueness or consumer ap-
peal ... [and] it should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to em-
20. See generally Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517
(1917).
21. See 38 Stat. 730 (1914). It is unlawful
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . machinery, supplies or other
commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption or resale ... or fix a
price charged therefor ... on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use... the goods... machinery, supplies or other commodi-
ties of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease,
sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
Id. (emphasis added).
22. Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 518.
23. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
24. See id. at 505-07.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 509.
27. Id. at 513.
28. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
29. See Loew's, 3 71 U.S. at 40, 52.
30. Id. at 45.
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bark upon a full-scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant mar-
ket for the tying product ....
B. Migration of Presumption from Patent Infringement to Antitrust Law
In International Salt Co. v. United States,32 an antitrust case, the
Court, while never citing the patent misuse doctrine directly, applied the
presumption that a patent confers market power in an antitrust case.33
While "patents confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward..
• [they] confer no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt.,
34
In upholding the district court's ruling, the Court stated that "by contract-
ing to close this market for [unpatented] salt against competition, Inter-
national [Salt] has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its patents
afford no immunity from the antitrust laws. 35
In International Salt, the Court broadened the scope of its analysis
of the rights and limitations conferred on patent holders to consider the
impact of a patent tying arrangement on the marketplace. The Court
conducted a weak market analysis of International Salt's patents, one
lacking any quantifiable assessment of the product or competition, stat-
ing that "[t]he volume of business affected by these [tying] contracts
cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial .... The paucity of
the Court's market power analysis in International Salt likely influenced
the Loew's Court's aversion to economic analysis fifteen years later.
In the same term as International Salt, the Court reinforced the link
between the patent misuse doctrine and antitrust law in United States v.
Columbia Steel Co.3 7 In Columbia Steel, the Court stated that "where a
complaint charges that the defendants have . . . licensed a patented de-
vice on condition that unpatented materials be employed in conjunction
with the patented device, then the amount of commerce involved is im-
material because such restraints are illegal per se."
38
C. Unlinking of the Patent Misuse Doctrine from Antitrust Law
After International Salt, the Court expanded the scope of its patent
tying jurisprudence beyond the traditional line of cases. While the tradi-
tional line of tying arrangements restricted the type of unpatented articles
31. ld. at 45 n.4.
32. 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (finding International Salt in violation of antitrust laws by requiring
licensees of its patented salt processing machines to purchase all salt used in the machine from
International Salt, even though International Salt agreed to meet any competitor's lower price).
33. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct at 1289.
34. Int'l Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 395-96.
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id.
37. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
38. Id. at 522-23.
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used by a licensee in operating a patented machine, 39 in Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Investment Co.,4° the Court addressed a tying arrange-
ment in the context of a combination patent. 41 In Mercoid, the unpat-
ented component at issue was combined with several other unpatented
components to form a unique and distinct product, patented as a combi-
nation.42 The Court felt that this form of tying was an unlawful expansion
of the rights granted through a patent and held that it could not find a
"difference in principle where the unpatented material or device is itself
an integral part of the structure embodying the patent [or a supply con-
sumed in the operation of a patented machine]. 43
Congress viewed Mercoid as "a barrier to enforcement of patentee's
rights." 44 And, when Congress enacted the Patent Act, it "significantly
changed existing law, and the change moved in the direction of expand-
ing the statutory protection enjoyed by patentees., 45 By enacting Section
271(c) of the Patent Act,46 Congress granted to patent holders a statutory
right to "sell non-staple parts or materials and confer an express or im-
plied license on the purchaser to use the patented combination or proc-
ess,"47 thus effectively overturning Mercoid.
However, despite Congress's actions, the Court continued to pre-
sume that a patent conferred market power over the tying product
through the end of the 1960's. The Court "consistently assumed that
'[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression
of competition.' 48  In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp. (Fortner 1),49 for example, the Court continued to apply the stan-
dards set by International Salt and Loew's: reaffirming "the applicability
39. See, e.g., Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. at 51-52; Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488, 490 (1942); A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. at 70 (White, J., dissenting); Motion Picture Patents Co.,
243 U.S. at 502.
40. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
41. See Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 664-65.
42. Id. at 667.
43. Id. at 665.
44. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Robin & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 213 (1980).
45. Id.
46. Section 271(c) of the Patent Act states:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a mate-
rial or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C.A § 27 1(c) (West 2006).
47. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.05[l] (Mark H. Wasserman et al. eds.,
Matthew Bender Co. 2006) (1978).
48. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1286 (citing Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 305-06 (1949)).
49. 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner 1) (holding that respondent U.S. Steel Corp. violated anti-
trust laws by tying low cost financing provided by a subsidiary (U.S. Steel Homes Credit) on the
condition that petitioner Fortner Enterprises, Inc., a real estate developer, purchase artificially high-
priced prefabricated homes made by U.S. Steel Homes).
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of the per se standard for general tying agreements without the necessity
for inquiry into . . .[the defendant's] market power., 50 Though not a
patent-tying case, Fortner I involved tying inexpensive financing to the
purchase of above-market priced pre-fabricated houses. 5' The Court
found the tying arrangement illegal.52 In his opinion for the majority,
Justice Black wrote that "restraint [on competition] results whenever the
seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in the market, even
if his power is not complete over them and over all other buyers in the
market.,53 It is notable that four justices dissented from the majority in
Fortner L54
In his dissent, Justice White reasoned that tying arrangements may
not be per se illegal, as "[t]he principal evil... of tying aims is the use of
power in one market to acquire power in, or otherwise distort, a second
market. This evil simply does not exist if there is no power in the first
market. ' 55 In a separate dissent, Justice Fortas disagreed with the major-
ity, but for a different reason than Justice White, writing that Fortner I
was not even a tying case, but one that "distort[s] the [tying] doctrine
' 56
because it merely provides "advantageous financing"
57 to the customer. 58
The dissent's view that tying arrangements may be pro-competitive pre-
vailed in Fortner H.59
D. The 1988 Patent Act Amendment and the Changing Attitudes of the
Court, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission
Toward Tying Arrangements
In 1977, the same parties in Fortner I appeared once again before
the Court in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
(Fortner 1/).60 In Fortner II, the Court unanimously held that "[w]ithout
any evidence that the [U.S. Steel Homes] Credit Corp. had some cost
advantage over its competitors . . . the [remaining evidence] does not
support the conclusion that petitioners had the kind of economic power
which Fortner had the burden of proving in order to prevail .. .,,6' The
50. Hayden, supra note 8, at 99 n.30.
51. See Fortnerl, 394 U.S. at 497.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 503.
54. See id. at 510, 520.
55. Id. at 519.
56. Id. at 522.
57. Id. at 523.
58. See id. at 522-23 ("This is a sale of a single product with the incidental provision of fi-
nancing. It is not a sale of one product on condition that the buyer will not deal with competitors for
another product or will buy the other product exclusively from the seller.").
59. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1287. See generally U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc.
(Fortner 11), 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (finding that the advantageous financing terms given by petitioner
did not automatically mean that petitioner's economic power was sufficient to make the tying ar-
rangement unlawful).
60. 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner 11).
61. Id. at 622.
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Court's desire for evidence of market power in Fortner H constituted a
direct rejection of its previous holdings in International Salt and Loew's,
where the Court required little or no economic analysis to establish the
market power of a tying product.
Though the Court in Fortner II eroded the presumption of market
power in tying arrangements, generally, the Court continued to presume
market power where the tying product was patented. 62 In Jefferson Par-
ish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,63 the penultimate case before the
Court on tying arrangements, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the
presumption of market power where the tying product is patented.
64
While maintaining the presumption, Jefferson Parish is noted for Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor
advocated "abandon[ing] the 'per se' label and refocus[ing] the inquiry
on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits,
that the tie may have.,
65
Just as Justice White's dissent in A. B. Dick spurred legislative action,
four years after O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish, Congress
amended the Patent Act to eliminate the presumption of market power in
the patent misuse context.66 Section 271(d) of the Patent Act expanded
protections for patent holders in tying arrangements to require a court to
conduct a market power analysis on the tying patent, instead of merely
presuming a patent-tying arrangement per se illegal.67 Despite the elimi-
nation of the presumption in the Patent Act, this did not necessarily
eliminate the presumption in an antitrust context.
In line with the Court's erosion of the irrebuttable presumption of market
power and Congress's expansion of patent holder protections, the De-
partment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued the
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property in 1995.68
Through these guidelines, the government's antitrust enforcement agen-
62. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 16.
63. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
64. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 16.
65. Id. at 35.
66. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1290.
67. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(5) (West 2006). Section 271(d) of the Patent Act states:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement
of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: ... 5) conditioned
the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition
of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of
the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the pat-
ent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
Id. (emphasis added).
68. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.3 (1995), available at http:www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/0558.pdf.
[Vol. 84:1
2006] ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS V. INDEPENDENT INK 275
cies adopted the view of Justice Fortas's dissent in Fortner /,69 that
"[a]lthough tying arrangements may result in anticompetitive effects,
such arrangements can also result in significant efficiencies and procom-
petitive benefits. 70 Instead of prosecuting all patent tying arrangements
under one standard, "[a]gencies will consider both the anticompetitive
effects and the efficiencies attributable to a tie-in., 71 After the issuance
of the Antitrust Guidelines, all three branches of government were in
agreement that a patent alone does not presumptively confer market
power, and that each patent tying case should be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis. It is in this context that the dispute between Illinois Tool
Works and Independent Ink arose.
II. ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC. V. INDEPENDENT INK, INC. 72
A. Facts
"Trident, Inc., and its parent company, Illinois Tool Works Inc., (collec-
tively "Illinois Tool Works") manufacture and market printing systems
that include three relevant components: (1) a patented piezoelectric im-
pulse ink jet printhead; (2) a patented ink container ... ; and (3) specially
designed, but unpatented, ink."
7 3
Illinois Tool Works sells its systems to "original equipment manu-
facturers (OEMs) who are licensed to incorporate the printheads and
containers into printers that are in turn sold to companies for use in print-
ing barcodes on cartons and packaging materials., 74 "The OEMs agree
that they will purchase their ink exclusively from [Illinois Tool Works],
and that neither they nor their customers will refill the patented contain-
ers with ink of any other kind., 75 This action commenced after Inde-
pendent Ink, Inc. "developed an ink with the same chemical composition
as the ink sold by petitioners.,
76
B. Procedural History
Illinois Tool Works reacted to Independent Ink's ink sales by filing a
patent infringement claim against Independent Ink, which was summa-
rily dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.77 Independent Ink subse-
quently filed suit against Illinois Tool Works, "seeking a judgment of
non-infringement and invalidity of Illinois Tool Works's patents. 78
69. See Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 523.
70. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 68, § 5.3.
71. Id.
72. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
73. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1284.
74. Id. at 1284-85.
75. Id. at 1285.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1284.
78. Id.
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Independent Ink then amended its complaint, alleging that Illinois Tool
Works's patent tying arrangement violated Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.79 Both parties filed for summary judgment.80 Independent
Ink did not "discuss the products at issue, their substitutes, or the relevant
markets," nor perform any "market power or at all. 8 1 Because the only
evidence of market power presented by Independent Ink was the patent
on the printhead, and it failed to define the tying product's product and
geographic markets, to show a dominant market share, or to identify bar-
riers to entry, the court entered summary judgment for Illinois Tool
Works.
2
Independent Ink appealed the district court's decision to grant the
Illinois Tool Works motion of summary judgment on the respondent's
Sherman Act Section 1 claim.83 After a careful review of the long his-
tory of Supreme Court decisions on tying arrangements, the Federal
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. 4 The court held
that "Supreme Court cases in this area squarely establish that patent...
tying, unlike other tying cases, do not require an affirmative demonstra-
tion of market power. Rather, International Salt and Loew's make clear
that the necessary market power to establish a [Sherman Act] section 1
violation is presumed., 85 The appellate court found that the Illinois Tool
Works arguments erred by "ignor[ing] the fact that it is the duty of a
court of appeals to follow the precedents of the Supreme Court until the
Court itself chooses to expressly overrule them."
86
The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to undertake a fresh exami-





C. Justice Stevens's Opinion
The Court heard arguments to determine whether the presumption
that a patent confers market power upon its holder "should survive as a
matter of antitrust law despite its demise in patent law." 88 In delivering
the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the Court's historically
"strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially diminished"
since the Court first encountered tying arrangements in the course of
patent infringement litigation in A. B. Dick Co.89 Then Justice Stevens
embarked on a discussion of the rise of the presumption from the patent
79. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. 111. Tool Works, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (2002).
80. Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
81. Id. at 1160.
82. See id. at 1167-73.
83. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. 111. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
84. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1285 (internal quotations omitted).
85. Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1348-49 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 1351.
87. Indep. Ink., 126 S. Ct. at 1285.
88. Id. at 1284.
89. Id. at 1286.
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misuse doctrine, the doctrine's intersection with antitrust law in Interna-
tional Salt, its reinforcement in Loew's, and finally, its untangling from
antitrust law in Fortner H and Jefferson Parish.90
Independent Ink conceded that the Court should not maintain a rule
of per se illegality, but argued in the alternative that the Court should
adopt either a narrower, limited irrebuttable presumption or establish a
rebuttable presumption of market power.91  In reliance on Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish, the consensus of the "vast
majority of academic literature," and the belief that "[m]any tying ar-
rangements, even those involving patents ... are fully consistent with a
free, competitive market," the Court rejected each of the Respondent's
proposals.92 The Court unanimously concluded that the mere fact that a
tying product is patented does not support such a presumption. 93 In abol-
ishing the presumption, the Court aligned its patent tying jurisprudence
with the sentiments of Congress, antitrust enforcement agencies, and
most economists.94
III. ANALYSIS
The Court's decision to abolish the presumption that a patent con-
fers market power was not only the logical choice of the three alterna-
tives presented by the parties, it was also the correct decision. While
conceding that the Court should not maintain a rule of per se illegality,
respondent Independent Ink argued that the court should (A) adopt a
narrower, limited irrebuttable presumption, (B) establish a rebuttable
presumption of market power.95 Petitioner Illinois Tool Works, in reli-
ance on recent Court decisions, the legislative actions of Congress, and
the wide support of academic and government enforcement authorities,
asked the Court to (C) eliminate the presumption altogether and adopt a
rule of reason standard.
Under the rule of reason, all purposes and potential effects of the
challenged restriction will be evaluated.96 Courts that apply the rule of
reason usually note briefly that the plaintiff has failed to define a relevant
market or has otherwise failed to show any significant threat to the health
of competition in the tied market.9 7 One factor, likely the most difficult
to define, is the identification of the relevant tying product and geo-
graphic markets in which it competes 98 Additionally a rule of reason
standard will require the presence of power in that market, for where no
90. Id. at 1285-91.
91. Id. at 1291-92.
92. Id. at 1292.
93. Id. at 1284.
94. Id. at 1293.
95. I11. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291-92 (2006).
96. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 114.
97. See Former Enters. v. United States (Former 1), 394 U.S. 495, 499-501 (1969).
98. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 112.
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market power exists, antitrust law is generally unconcerned by the be-
havior of firms.99 A third factor that courts may consider under the rule-
of-reason standard is the nature of the challenged restraint and that re-
straint's likely effects on competition.'00
Further, the Court's adoption of a rule of reason standard to assess
the market power of tying products in Independent Ink left two key ques-
tions unanswered. First, how does a party prove market power and how
much market power is sufficient to deem a patent tying arrangement ille-
gal? Second, how will the additional burden on parties to develop evi-
dence of market power impact judicial resources? An analysis of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish as well as a brief analysis of
the United States Satellite Television market from 1997 through 2006
will help answer the first question. The latter question will be answered
by analyzing the market power evidence presented by Independent Ink
and, additionally, A.L Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.,101 a Sixth
Circuit tying case decided after Jefferson Parish.
A. Create a Limited, Irrebuttable Presumption
In its brief, Independent Ink argued for a narrow ruling that would
maintain an irrebuttable presumption in limited cases.10 2  Independent
Ink asked the Court to presume market power when the "tying arrange-
ment involve[s] the purchase of unpatented goods over a period of time,
a so called 'requirements tie.,, 10 3 Independent Ink's proposal is anti-
thetical to the 1988 amendment to § 271(d) of the Patent Code, which
abolished the market power presumption in the patent misuse context. 
°4
While the legislative history of the 1988 Patent Code Amendment indi-
cates that Congress intended to maintain the market power presumption
for patents in an antitrust context, 0 5 the Court has since held that "it
would be anomalous to equate patents with power for antitrust purposes
but not for misuse purposes."' 0 6 Independent Ink's limited irrebuttable
presumption proposal also conflicts with the 1995 Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission antitrust guidelines that state that the
government's two antitrust enforcement agencies "will not presume that
a patent ... necessarily confers market power upon its owner."'10 7 Fi-
nally, the Court's decisions in Fortner II and Jefferson Parish make clear
99. See Feldman, supra note 10, at 400.
100. See id. at 403-04.
101. 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding the district court's summary judgment order
because defendant lacked sufficient market power in the tying product market to influence the mar-
ket for the tied product).
102. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291-92.
103. Id. at 1292.
104. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(5) (West 2006).
105. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 44 (citing 134 Cong. Rec. 32, 295 (1988)).
106. AREEDA, supra note 13, 1737c.
107. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 68, § 2.2.
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the Court's desire for market power evidence before condemning a tying
arrangement.
08
B. Create a Rebuttable Presumption
Alternatively, Independent Ink proposed that the Court "should en-
dorse a rebuttable presumption that patentees possess market power
when they condition the purchase of the patented product on an agree-
ment to buy unpatented goods exclusively from the patentee."' 0 9  By
ruling that there was a rebuttable presumption, the Court would essen-
tially be following the court of appeals' decision." 0 However, that
would be a mistake. The court of appeals' finding of a rebuttable pre-
sumption was based on a misinterpretation of Jefferson Parish."' While
the court of appeals concluded that "Jefferson Parish confirmed that In-
ternational Salt created only a [rebuttable] presumption of market
power,"'"12 in the instant case, the Court stated that Jefferson Parish
maintained the irrebuttable, "patent-equals-market-power presump-
tion." 3 The court of appeals' misinterpretation of Supreme Court dicta
is especially ironic considering that the appellate court scolded Interna-
tional Tool Works for requesting a form of relief outside the bounds of
precedent.'114
C. Abolish the Presumption
While the question of the market power in the relevant market for
the tying product is but one of four requirements in a claim arising under
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 1 5 it is the most difficult to
prove. Per se rules permit the court to conserve judicial resources by
avoiding a burdensome market power inquiry where anticompetitive
conduct likely exists.1 6 The per se presumption of market power in pat-
ent tying cases was incorrect for three reasons. First, courts have
108. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. (Fortner 11), Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977); see
also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-18 (1984).
109. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
110. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating
that "[o]nce the plaintiff establishes a patent tying agreement, it is the defendant's burden to rebut
the presumption of market power and consequent illegality that arises from patent tying").
111. See Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1351 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 16) (stating
that Jefferson Parish confirmed that International Salt created only a presumption of market power
and that "it would stretch the language of 'fair to presume' beyond the breaking point to say that
such a presumption is irrebuttable").
112. Id.
113. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct at 1290.
114. See Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1351.
115. See Indep. lnk, Inc. v. Trident Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
In order to establish that a tying arrangement violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a
plaintiff must establish: 1) two distinct products or services; 2) a sale or agreement to sell
the tying product conditioned upon the purchase of the tied product; 3) market power in
the relevant market for the tying product; and 4) the tied product involves a not insub-
stantial amount of interstate commerce.
Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (internal quotations omitted).
116. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 16 n.25.
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adopted an overly broad interpretation of the Court's holding in
Loew's 17 by blurring the distinctions between patent and copyright law.
Second, the Court has traditionally disfavored presumptions in antitrust
law, preferring instead to examine each claim on a case-by-case basis.' 1
8
Third, the presumption, especially an irrebuttable presumption, treated
defendants in patent tying claims unfairly. For the foregoing reasons, the
Court correctly rejected Independent Ink's arguments for a limited irre-
buttable presumption or a broader, rebuttable presumption, and instead
adopted a rule of reason standard to examine market power.
1. Overly Broad Interpretation of Loew's
Instead of relying on a fact-driven analysis of the tying product's
market or the product's power in a market, the Court has previously used
a uniqueness test.' 9 Uniqueness, in the context of copyright and patent
tying cases, is a term of art, requiring that "the product is distinctive and
unusual, leading some customers to prefer it over any others; and there
exists a barrier preventing competitors from producing the product.'
20
The uniqueness test was first stated in Loew's, in the context of a block-
booking case. 121 In Loew's, the Court stated that "the mere presence of
competing substitutes for the tying product. . . is insufficient to destroy
the legal, and indeed the economic, distinctiveness of the copyrighted
product."
122
Proponents of the presumption argue that patented products, such as
the printhead at issue in Independent Ink, satisfy this uniqueness test be-
cause they "are novel by statutory definition; they are legally unique,
distinctive and enforceable through infringement actions.' 23  However,
such a broad interpretation of Loew's incorrectly blurs the distinctions
between patent and copyright law. Where copyrights protect original
works of authorship, patents cover novel and useful products and proc-
117. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (stating that the economic
power required for a claim arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act may be presumed where "the
tying product is patented or copyrighted").
118. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 115 n. 145. Hayden stated,
Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities
are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust
claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the particular facts disclosed by the record.
In determining the existence of market power, and specifically the responsiveness of the
sales of one product to price changes of the other, this Court has examined closely the
economic reality of the market at issue.
Id. (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992))
(internal quotations omitted)).
119. William Montgomery, Note, The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and
Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1146 (1985).
120. Id. at 1146-47.
121. Id. at 1142 ("Block-booking is an arrangement whereby a film distributor licenses one
film or group of films only on the condition that the exhibitor lease another film or group of films.").
122. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 49.
123. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 44.
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ess. 124 While a copyrighted work may conceivably be so unique or dis-
tinctive it has no identifiable substitute, practical substitutes for a pat-
ented product are available so long as the patent's claims do not preclude
any foreseeable alternative.1 25 It is the presence of practical substitutes
for patented tying products, so clearly absent in the context of a copy-
righted tie that permits a factual inquiry into the tying product's market
power, absolving the necessity for a presumption.
2. The Court's Traditional Disfavor of Presumptions
Traditionally, the Court has analyzed antitrust cases either through a
per se standard or under the rule of reason. 126 However, as stated by
Justice Blackmun in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc. ,127 the Court prefers to examine antitrust claims on a case-by-case
basis, and not through presumptions.128 In choosing to abolish the pre-
sumption, the Court followed Justice Blackmun's guidance, holding that
"tying arrangements involving patented products should be evaluated
under the [rule of reason] standards applied in cases like Fortner II and
[O'Connor's concurrence in] Jefferson Parish, rather than under the per
se rule applied in Morton Salt and Loew S.,,
129
A rule of reason analysis involves inquiry into an alleged restraint
on trade by examining the effect of the practice on the marketplace.
30
Courts that have applied the rule of reason usually note that "the plaintiff
has failed to define a relevant market or has otherwise failed to show any
significant threat to the health of competition in the tied market."' 31 A
determination that a patent tying arrangement is illegal "must be sup-
ported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere
presumption thereof."' 32 The Court's decision provides for a more equi-
table treatment of defendants in patent tying cases at a cost of increasing
the burden on parties to prove the existence, or non-existence, of market
power.
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (West 2006) (defining works of authorship as literary and musical
works, sculpture, motion pictures, and others); see also CHIsUM, supra note 47, § 1.01.
125. See Charles W. Adams, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Becoming a Derelict on the Waters
of Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REv. 1113, 1114 (2006); see also Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and
Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730
(2000).
126. Hayden, supra note 8, at 98 n.26.
127. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
128. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67; see also Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925); Hayden, supra note 8, at 115 n.145.
129. See Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
130. See AREEDA, supra note 13, 1511; see also Aliza Reicher, Comment, Off With Their
Printheads! An End to the Per Se Presumption of Illegality for Patent Ties in Illinois Tool Works v.
Independent Ink, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 297, 300 n.20 (2006); see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 101
(West 2006).
131. Hayden, supra note 8, at 104 n.67.
132. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
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While it may be argued that a rebuttable presumption would have
"fairly allocate[d] the burdens [on plaintiffs and defendants] and dic-
tate[d] an efficient ordering of proof at trial,"' 33 it is unlikely. Even if
there is a rebuttable presumption of market power, each party has an
incentive to develop evidence of market power, or lack thereof. In other
words, a rebuttable presumption is the worst of both worlds: it lacks the
efficiencies inherent in an irrebuttable presumption and plaintiffs, fairly
or unfairly, are burdened with developing evidence contradicting the
patent-holder's denial of market power. 34 In its own brief for this case,
and as further developed below, respondent Independent Ink states that it
developed evidence that the petitioner's tying product had market power,
undermining its arguments that developing evidence of market power is
costly to plaintiffs, is difficult to obtain, and that such evidence is not
necessary to succeed in a patent tying claim.
3. Presumption was Unfair to Defendants
Though the Court has evaluated tying arrangements under a more
liberal standard than other antitrust behaviors deemed to be per se illegal,
the standard applied to tying arrangements has been interpreted to pro-
hibit tying that economic analysis has shown to be beneficial to consum-
ers. 135 "Application of the per se standard and presumption of market
power for patented products eliminates the need to define a relevant
market," ignoring any pro-competitive benefits created by the tie. 
36
"The Supreme Court has consistently grounded its per se rule... on
the special statutory grant of monopolistic rights afforded patentees. 137
Ironically, while patent tying rules were shaped to fit antitrust law, the
patent policy of encouraging innovation via a grant of a limited monop-
oly is at odds with the antitrust policy of prevention of restraints on com-
petition and trade. 138 However, a legal monopoly protected by a patent
"is not necessarily or even typically a market monopoly."' 3 9 "The fact
that a tying agreement involves a patented product should not matter for
133. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 46.
134. Contra McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 46.
135. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 116.
137. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 42.
138. See Axis S.P.A. v. Micafil, Inc., 870 F.2d 1105, 1111 (6th Cir. 1989).
Our patent and antitrust laws seek to further different and opposing policies. Patent laws
grant a monopoly for a limited time in order 'to promote the progress of... useful arts..
. .' Antitrust laws, on the other hand, are designed to promote and protect competition in
the marketplace. Thus, a lawfully acquired patent creates a monopoly that does not vio-
late the antitrust laws.
Axis S.P.A., 870 F.2d at 1111 (citing United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647
(9th Cir. 1981)).
139. AREEDA, supra note 13, at 1737a.
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purposes of an antitrust inquiry."'140 While market forces may not impact
or impede patented products in the same manner as unpatented products,
market power for the patented product does not automatically follow
from the fact that the product is patented.' 41 Despite such evidence indi-
cating differences between the legal monopoly granted by a patent and
the anticompetitive aspects of an economic monopoly, the irrebuttable
presumption unfairly prevented defendants from presenting evidence
distinguishing legal monopoly from economic monopoly.
Those in favor of the presumption have argued that the elimination
of the presumption will only shift a heavy burden from defendants onto
plaintiffs and consumers. 142  First, proponents argue that defendants
should prove the absence of market power in the tying product because
the "defendant . . . is best positioned to have [market power informa-
tion.]"' 43  This argument is undermined by the market power evidence
presented by Independent Ink in its brief.'44 Further, a plaintiff would
also be strategically disadvantaged by not developing contradictory evi-
dence to refute a defendant's definition of the relevant market.
Second, proponents also claim that big business will force consum-
ers to purchase "replacement tires, batteries, motor oil, or even gasoline
from only your automobile's manufacturer" in the absence of the pre-
sumption. 145 This proposition exaggerates the potential impact of the
abolition of the presumption. Such forced arrangements would still be
subject to review of the economic benefits offered by the tie.
1 46
Finally, Independent Ink, relying on the amicus brief of Professor F. M.
Scherer, argues that a rebuttable presumption of market power is correct
because patents involved in litigation are much more valuable than simi-
140. Hayden, supra note 8, at 114 n.139 (citing Hovenkamp et al., The Interface Between
Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law: Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property
Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1725 (2003)).
141. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 114-15 n.141; see also Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 395-96, 401-02 (1947) (holding that the challenged tying agreements were unlawful de-
spite the fact that the tying item was patented, not because of it); John Homick, The Per Se Rule in
Tying Contexts: A Critical View, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 703, 714 (1985) ("In arriving at its decision...
the Court placed no reliance on the fact that a patent was involved nor did it give the slightest inti-
mation that the outcome would have been any different if that had not been the case.").
142. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 38-39 ("Defendants seek to have the Court require
plaintiff to prove by way of survey evidence, expert market analysis including complicated and
expensive proofs of cross-elasticity of demand, and likely more, that defendants actually possess true
market power in the printhead, monopoly power of its patent notwithstanding.").
143. Id. at 45-46.
144. See Brief for Respondent at 45-48, Il1. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281
(2006) (No. 04-1329) (conducting a market power analysis entitled "The Judgment Below Should
Be Affirmed Because, Even Without a Presumption, Market Power Was Demonstrated on the Re-
cord Below").
145. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 39 ("This case should be important to everyone who does
not wish to be forced to purchase, for example, replacement tires, batteries, motor oil, or even gaso-
line from only your automobile's manufacturer, or replacement film from only the maker of your
camera, or generic or off-patent drugs in combination with desirable patented drugs.").
146. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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lar patents that were not involved in litigation.147 However, the value of
one patent isolated from all other substitutes is irrelevant in an antitrust
context, and thus Professor Scherer's basis for maintaining a presump-
tion fails on two grounds. First, Justice O'Connor's market power analy-
sis guidelines require a comparison of the tying product to others in the
marketplace.148  Professor Scherer's method, in contrast, analyzes the
tying product in isolation, failing to consider possible substitute products.
149 Second, by determining market power on the grounds that a party
filed a lawsuit effectively substitutes the courtroom for the marketplace,
failing to consider the possible beneficial effects of the tie on the market-
place. 150 Adopting the litigation equals market power standard advanced
by Professor Scherer would place an even more egregious burden on
defendants than already exists.
D. Under the Rule of Reason, How Do Parties Prove Market Power and
How Much Market Power is Sufficient to Deem a Patent Tying Ar-
rangement Illegal?
By abolishing the market power presumption, the Court now re-
quires both parties in a patent tying suit to present evidence of the tying
product's market power, or lack thereof, sufficient to meet a rule of rea-
son standard. This new standard requires parties to "prove by way of
survey evidence, expert market analysis including complicated and ex-
pensive proofs of cross-elasticity of demand ... that defendant's actually
possess true market power. ' ' 151 While the United States Department of
Justice defines market power as "the ability profitably to maintain prices
above, or output below, competitive levels for a significant period of
time,"' 152 in her concurrence in Jefferson Parish, Justice O'Connor of-
fered a more open-ended explanation of market power. An examination
of how regulators and competitors in the satellite-broadcast market have
defined the market provides a view of how difficult it can be to define a
product's market. It will also provide guidance on how future litigants in
147. See Brief for Professor F. M. Scherer, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-01329). Professor Scherer's brief
states,
Research into the subject of why particular patents are valuable has shown that patents
involved in litigation are much more valuable than similar patents that were not involved
in litigation. Results from a study of German patents show that patents in litigation are
between 11.2 and 42.6 times more valuable than other patents, all else equal. In other
words, the fact of litigation itself is a strong signal of a patent's "appreciable economic
power."
Id. (citing Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464); see also Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
148. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 37-38 nn.6-7 (arguing that market power, meas-
ured by a high market share, is a factor in determining illegality, but only when it includes "all
reasonable substitutes for the product").
149. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 147.
150. See id. at 34 (noting that courts have not found tying agreements illegal per se without
further proof of an anticompetitive effect on the market place).
151. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 39.
152. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 68, § 2.2.
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patent tying cases will strategically define the market to suit each party's
desired outcome.
1. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in Jefferson Parish
In her concurrence in Jefferson Parish, Justice O'Connor touched
on, but left unresolved, the question of how much market power is neces-
sary to adversely impact the tied-product market. 53  While Justice
O'Connor identified several Court opinions that considered market
power in tying arrangements, previous attempts at market power analysis
by the Court were tepid at best.' 54  These cases demonstrate that the
Court, even when applying the patent-equals-market-power presumption,
has never been willing to condemn all tying arrangements as illegal
without proof of market power. 55 Because a patent was automatically
presumed to confer market power, the courts were not required to con-
duct a substantial market power analysis, instead relying on a "unique-
ness test."'' 56 The Court in Independent Ink likewise neglected to state
how much market power is required to affect the marketplace. 57 The
Court's reticence to define such a key, qualitative component of the anti-
trust analysis in either case runs counter to Congress's intention that the
courts would do So.15
Though Justice O'Connor did not provide future courts with clear
directions of how to assess market power, she stated several general ele-
ments that should be considered. In Jefferson Parish, a market share of
thirty per cent was not considered to be an indication of significant mar-
ket power. 5 9 From Fortner II, Justice O'Connor cited the Court's con-
sideration of "the size and profitability of the firm seeking to impose the
tie, the character of the tying product, and the effects of the tie."'' 60  In
both Fortner I and II the Court defined market power as the ability to
raise prices "above the levels that would be charged in a competitive
market."
161
A second analysis proposed by Justice O'Connor attempts to deter-
mine whether there is "a substantial threat that the tying seller will ac-
153. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 37-38 n.6.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 34 (stating that tying arrangements are unlike other antitrust behaviors such as price
fixing and division of markets are subject to per se illegality).
156. Montgomery, supra note 119, at 1146.
157. See Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291-92 (arguing against a per se rule as patents can convey
varying degrees of market power resulting in different abilities to affect the market place).
158. See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be the Tie? ", 4
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 90 n.556 (1991) (noting that Congress intentionally provided a vague and
open-ended definition, with the direction that the Courts should tailor the remedy to fit the particular
market context of patent rights).
159. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 26-27.
160. Id at 38 (citing Fortner I, 429 U.S. at 620) ("(T]he effects of the tie tare] the price
charged for the products, the number of customers affected, [and] the functional relation between the
tied and tying product.").
161. See id at 27 n.46 (citing Fortner 11, 429 U.S. at 620 and Fortner l, 394 U.S. at 503-04).
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quire market power in the tied-product market."' 162 This analysis is con-
cerned with the tendency of the tying agreement to preclude a buyer from
purchasing the unpatented tied product elsewhere163 and addresses the
Court's historical concern that tying arrangements "attempt to increase
the scope of the monopoly granted by a patent"'164 to impact the market
for the tied product. In markets with many stable sellers or with low
barriers to entry, the risk of the seller acquiring market power in the tied-
product market is likely low.' 65 For example, "if one of a dozen food
stores in a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also
took sugar it would hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if its
competitors were ready and able to sell flour by itself.'' 166 Applying this
example to Independent Ink, the tied unpatented ink, like example's
sugar, is a commodity available and used for a plethora of purposes.
Through analyzing the availability of substitutes, the final indicia of
market power identified by Justice O'Connor, courts are better able to
evaluate market share evidence. 167 Evidence of a product's high market
share indicates market power only if the market is properly defined to
include all reasonable substitutes. Since Jefferson Parish did not involve
a patent tying arrangement, it is likely that "Justice O'Connor's reference
to 'close substitutes' presumably does not include close substitutes that
are infringing"' 16 on a patent. In defining the boundaries of a patent,
courts include close substitutes of the patented product under the doctrine
of equivalents.169 In applying the doctrine of equivalents, the court de-
termines whether the disputed product falls within the claims of the pat-
ented product.170 Because a patent grants the holder the exclusive right
to manufacture and sell the patented invention and its substantial equiva-
lents, substitutes may eitherinfringe upon the patented product or are too
distinct to actually be considered a substitute.171
Independent Ink provides an example of how substitutes do not vio-
late the doctrine of equivalents. Illinois Tool Works's patented printhead
was developed as an alternative to print-and-apply labels. 172  The
printhead performs the same basic functions as the labels, but it does it at
a lower cost and more efficiently. 73 When the case returns to the district
162. Id. at 38.
163. Hayden, supra note 8, at 108.
164. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 70 (1912) (White, J., dissenting).
165. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 38.
166. Id. at 12 (internal quotations omitted).
167. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 109 n.99.
168. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 44.
169. Id.; see also CHISUM, supra note 47, § 16.02[l][a][ii].
170. See CHISUM, supra note 47, § 16.02[1][a][ii] (stating that when an accused product or
process falls within a patent's claims, there is literal [patent] infringement and that using the claims
of a patent to develop a new product or process meets the definition of equivalency).




2006] ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS V. INDEPENDENT INK 287
court, Illinois Tool should be able to argue that while its printhead is both
unique and distinct enough to deserve a patent, it does not have market
power because there are substitutes available that perform the same func-
tions.
2. Example: United States Satellite Television Broadcasting Market
1997-2006
In defining a product's market, "there are a range of markets vary-
ing in scope that may be chosen for use in an antitrust case." 174 For an
example of how both time and expectation shape market identification,
consider the satellite television industry from 1997 and 2006. In this ten
year period, the Department of Justice, EchoStar, and DirecTV in a less
than public fashion, reversed their market definitions of satellite-
broadcast companies. 75 While this example discusses market definition
in the context of mergers, it is analogous to the sort of scenario a court
might face in a patent tying case. As such, it reveals the complexity of
identifying a product's relevant market. As demonstrated in the exam-
ple, EchoStar reversed the definition of its own product's relevant market
in a twenty-month period. 176 The process of identifying the product's
relevant market will likely be a protracted endeavor, possibly foreclosing
business opportunities to litigants, as the speed of change in the business
world outpaces the drawn-out judicial review process.
177
DirecTV and EchoStar are satellite television providers that offer
consumers hundreds of channels of programming with the purchase of a
satellite receiver and a monthly subscription. 178 In 2002, EchoStar failed
in its bid to acquire DirecTV from Hughes Electronics Corporation on
antitrust grounds. DirecTV was later sold to News Corp. in 2003.
DirecTV and EchoStar provide satellite service to 27 million of the 110
million homes in the United States, 179 or roughly ninety percent of all
satellite-connected homes in the U.S.180 Cable television companies pro-
vide service to 66.5 million of the 110 million households.'1
8
174. Hayden, supra note 8, at 116 n.150.
175. See Andy Pasztor & Yochi J. Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Arguments May Foil Its Bid for
Hughes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at B8 [hereinafter Pasztor & Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Argu-
ments]; Andy Pasztor & Peter Grant, Leading the News: Regulators Sue to Block EchoStar Deal,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2002, at A3 [hereinafter Pasztor & Grant, Regulators Sue to Block].
176. See Pasztor & Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Arguments, supra note 175, at 18.
177. See Editorial, Who Defines a Market?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2004, at A16.
178. See http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/global/contentPage.jsp?assetld=1400010 (last
visited Sept. 26, 2006); http://www.dishnetwork.com/content/aboutus/companyprofile/
index.shtml (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
179. Julia Angwin & Andy Pasztor, Weaker Reception: Satellite TV Growth is Losing Altitude
as Cable Takes Off, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2006, at AI [hereinafter Angwin & Pasztor, Weaker Re-
ception].
180. Pasztor & Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Arguments, supra note 175, at B8.
181. Angwin & Pasztor, Weaker Reception, supra note 179, at Al.
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Since 1997, the Department of Justice, EchoStar, and DirecTV have
publicly and frequently offered seemingly contradictory definitions of
market for satellite-broadcasting companies. 182 In 1997, in reviewing a
proposed acquisition of a satellite-broadcast firm by News Corp., the
"Justice Department ruled that [the satellite-broadcast company] com-
peted in a broad market comprising both cable and the satellite com-
pany." 183  In a lawsuit filed in February 2000 by EchoStar against
DirecTV's former parent company, "EchoStar's lawyers specifically
argued that satellite-to-home broadcast services constituted a stand-alone
market, distinctly separate from the cable business;' 84 a narrow market
definition. In 2001, when EchoStar attempted to purchase DirecTV from
Hughes Electronics, it changed its argument to combat antitrust con-
cerns. 85 EchoStar now argued for a broader market definition, insisting
that satellite and cable providers "should be considered a single market,
providing . . .entertainment options and Internet connections that are
indistinguishable from each other regardless of how consumers get the
signal."'' 86 EchoStar's bid to purchase DirecTV was blocked by regula-
tors and lawmakers, with News Corp. initiating a behind-the-scenes lob-
bying campaign that emphasized the antitrust issues of the acquisition, as
seen through a narrow market definition. 8 7 Today, now that cable pro-
viders bundle television programming, broadband internet, and telephone
service at a price comparable to an EchoStar or DirecTV television pro-
gramming price, some analysts predict EchoStar and DirecTV will be
forced to merge. 188  For these companies to merge, DirecTV would be
compelled to adopt a broad market definition that recognizes cable op-
erators as competitors.
E. How Will the Burden to Develop Evidence of Market Power Impact
Judicial Resources?
The two subsections below provide a context for understanding the
type of information that future patent tying litigants will present and how
courts will analyze this information. While arguing that a market power
analysis is burdensome, unjustifiably costly, 189 and irrelevant where the
182. See Pasztor & Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Arguments, supra note 174, at B8; Pasztor &
Grant, Regulators Sue to Block, supra note 175, at A3.




187. See Andy Pasztor & John Lippman, EchoStar Talks with Murdoch, Liberty Media About
Possible Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan 21, 2003, at Al.
188. See Angwin & Pasztor, Weaker Reception, supra note 179, at Al.
189. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 42 ("The rationale for per se rules in part is to avoid a
burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompeti-
tive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular case
at bar involves anticompetitive conduct." (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 16 n.25 (1984))).
[lit should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to embark upon a full-scale factual
inquiry into the scope of the relevant market for the tying product and into the corollary
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tying product is patented or copyrighted, Independent Ink actually sub-
mitted a market power analysis of International Tool Works's patented
printhead in its brief to the Court.' 90 The sole purpose of a presumption
is to fill an otherwise unavailable, evidential void. 191 Independent Ink's
argument that maintaining the presumption is undermined by presenting
evidence that previously unavailable evidence of market power of the
tying product is, in fact, available.
While the brief did not mention Independent Ink's source or process
for obtaining such information, it is of a type that might logically be pre-
pared by an expert. In future cases, it is likely that courts will define the
tying product's relevant market, only after hearing competing testimony
from party experts.
Also, in A.I. Root v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.,192 a case heard
twenty years before Independent Ink, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals'
very broad interpretation of Loew's compelled it to examine market
power evidence of a copyrighted tying product. While the court may
have decided issues of fact in an appeal from summary judgment, neither
party appealed. Though A.I. Root was summarily adjudicated, it is likely
that future parties would prefer to more fully litigate patent tying claims
than settle. As explained through the satellite-broadcast market example
above, the process of defining the relevant market of a tying product can
be a complicated and confusing proposition. A party whose expert can
bring clarity to the court will be greatly advantaged.
1. Independent Ink's Evidence of Market Power for Illinois Tool
Works's Patented Printhead
The market power evidence presented by Independent Ink is sub-
stantial. 193 In the final section of its brief, Independent Ink defines the
relevant market for Illinois Tool Works's printhead,194 presents printhead
market share information currently and historically, 95 and compares
Illinois Tool Works's tied-ink pricing to competitors.1 96  While Inde-
pendent Ink provides a good roadmap for conducting market analysis in
problem of the seller's percentage share in that market. This is even more obviously true
when the tying product is patented or copyrighted, in which case ... sufficiency of eco-
nomic power is presumed.
See id (quoting United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962)).
190. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 147, at 45-48 (conducting a market power analysis).
191. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 115 nn. 142-43.
192. 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
193. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 147, at 45-48 (presenting market power evidence).
194. Id. at 45 (stating inkjet printers used for carton coding applications are the relevant mar-
ket).
195. Id. (stating that Illinois Tool Works accounts for ninety five percent of the inkjet printers
for carton coding applications market currently, and approximately 100% of the marketplace from
1994 to 1998).
196. Id. at 46 ("[Illinois Tool Works] charged nearly three times more than Independent Ink
and other competitors for replacement ink .... ).
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future patent tying cases, the analysis' quality and location as Independ-
ent Ink's final argument to the Court undermines Independent Ink's cen-
tral goal of maintaining some form of presumption.
2. AI Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.
In A.L Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics Inc., the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit found the tying arrangement involving a copyrighted
product to be legal after examining the market power of the tying prod-
uct. 19 7 By analyzing the tying product's market power, the court veered
from the per se rule, rejected Loew's and instead relied on Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish and a Columbia University
Law Review note. 198 This case and the emphasis it places on identifying
a product's relevant market, provides a roadmap to understanding the
structure of future patent tying cases.
The court conducted a two-part analysis that first determined the
relevant market of the tying product and second analyzed the defendant's
position within the relevant market. To identify the tying product's rele-
vant market, the court used a reasonable interchangeability standard that
examined identical or available substitutes to the tying product.' 99 The
plaintiff, A.I. Root Co., sought to define the relevant market narrowly to
only equipment that used the copyrighted software.2 00 The court, how-
ever, identified the relevant product market as the small business com-
puter market, a much larger market that includes IBM, NCR, and Seiko
as competitors to the defendant. 20  By comparing the defendant in the
larger, small business computer market, the defendant's market share
was determined to be two to four per cent of the market.20 2 Since the
tying product was copyrighted, application of the narrower standard ad-
vanced by the plaintiff would likely find the defendant possessed the
requisite market power.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision to abolish the presumption that a patent con-
fers market power was not only the logical choice of the three alterna-
tives presented by the parties, it was also the correct decision. The per se
presumption of market power in patent tying cases was incorrect for
three reasons. First, courts have adopted an overly broad interpretation
197. A.I Root, 806 F.2d at 675.
198. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 43-44; see also A.1 Root, 806 F.2d at 675-76.
199. A.I Root, 806 F.2d at 675 ("The essential test for ascertaining the relevant product market
involves the identification of those products or services that are either (1) identical to or (2) available
substitutes for the defendants' product or service." (quoting White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp.
Supply, 723 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1983))).
200. Id.
201. See id. at 675-76.
202. See id. at 675.
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of the Court's holding in Loew 's20 3 by blurring the distinctions between
patent and copyright law. Second, the Court has traditionally disfavored
presumptions in antitrust law, preferring instead to examine each claim
on a case-by-case basis. 2°4 Third, the presumption, especially when it is
irrebuttable, treats defendants in patent tying claims unfairly. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court correctly rejected Independent Ink's argu-
ments for a limited irrebuttable presumption or a broader, rebuttable pre-
sumption, and instead adopted a rule of reason standard to examine mar-
ket power.
While the Court in Independent Ink did not define the factors of an
illegal tie, other sources provide guidance. Future courts faced with pat-
ent tying cases should refer to the elements cited by Justice O'Connor in
-Jefferson Parish, the Sixth Circuit's market power analysis in A.1. Root,
and the market analysis submitted by Independent Ink in the final section
of its brief. The most difficult element for courts in future patent tying
cases will be to define the relevant market of a tying product, because
parties have a strategic interest in having the Court adopt their own defi-
nition of the tying product's relevant market.
Thomas P. Walsh, 11"
203. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 46 (1962) (stating that the economic
power required for a claim arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act may be presumed where the
tying product is patented or copyrighted).
204. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 115 n.145 ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic
distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court
has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the particular facts
disclosed by the record. In determining the existence of market power, and specifically the respon-
siveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the other, this Court has examined closely
the economic reality of the market at issue." (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted)).
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